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Ten years after his death, it is fi tting to remember the 
life and work of Henry Lang in this journal. He can be 
regarded as the father of the Institute of Policy Studies. 
The honorary doctorate the university bestowed on him 
in 1984 acknowledged the great contribution he had 
made to his alma mater and to university education in 
the course of his distinguished career.
Born Heinrich in Vienna on 3 March 1919, Henry 
George Lang died in Wellington on 17 April 1997, as 
one of the small group fi rst admitted to the new Order 
of New Zealand, designed to be New Zealand’s highest 
honour, in 1989. The award recognised what he had 
done to transform the Treasury, strengthen the public 
service and contribute in many ways to the economic, 
social and cultural development of New Zealand.
He escaped to New Zealand with his mother, who 
was Jewish, and his stepfather, Ernst Plischke, after 
the German occupation of his home country, arriving 
here in May 1939. The New Zealand to which they 
came was very British-oriented and on the brink of 
participating in the Second World War. Those from 
other backgrounds had to overcome a good deal of 
suspicion and discrimination (Tyler, 2000).
Henry Lang readily adapted to the New Zealand 
environment. As John Martin observed in his excellent 
entry on him in the Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, he had ‘an extraordinary gift for friendship 
extending across generations, occupations and 
location’ (Martin, 2000, p.279). He quickly obtained 
employment, fi rst in a prune canning factory, and 
later successively as bookkeeper, accountant and acting 
secretary of Warner Brothers Pictures. He married 
Octavia (Tup) Turton in 1942. He had met her on 
a skiing trip. Henry was already accomplished in the 
sport, which became one of many shared interests with 
Tup during a long and happy marriage, from which 
three daughters and a son survive.1 
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He arrived with a good foundation from his Austrian 
education. He studied part time in the 1940s at 
Victoria University College, completing a BCom in 
accountancy and economics in 1945 and a BA in 
philosophy in 1947. 
After serving in the air force between 1944 and 1946, 
Lang was appointed to the investigating staff of the 
Economic Stabilisation Commission. This commission, 
which was chaired by the then secretary to the Treasury, 
Bernard Ashwin, had been the heart of New Zealand’s 
wartime economic policy making. It remained very 
infl uential in New Zealand’s highly regulated economic 
system in the early postwar period. Its staff contained 
more economic expertise during this period than 
the Treasury. Lang’s work enabled him to develop 
constructive links with leaders of the major interest 
groups that interacted with government in negotiating 
‘fair shares’ in the development of fi scal and incomes 
policy at the time. 
While Lang never took a postgraduate degree in 
economics, he achieved a deep understanding of the 
discipline, both through his work at the commission 
and through a secondment to do postgraduate work 
full time, including study of public economics, at 
Victoria University College for the Diploma of Public 
Administration in 1949 and 1950. Some joint work 
done during this period on national income with John 
Baker, who went on to become government statistician, 
was published in the 1950 New Zealand Offi cial Yearbook 
(Baker and Lang, 1950). On completion of the DPA, 
Lang was transferred to the Treasury as an investigating 
offi cer, joining a few colleagues from the Economic 
Stabilisation Commission who had preceded him. He 
was promoted to senior research offi cer in 1954.
1 The Langs were devastated by the death of their daughter Fran, with 
her husband, in an air crash shortly after their marriage in England.
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Another important milestone in his progress in 
the public service was his secondment as economic 
counsellor in the New Zealand High Commission in 
London, where he served between 1955 and early 1958. 
It was typical of Lang’s approach to getting things done 
that, when he discovered that I was setting out to work at 
Chatham House on the implications for New Zealand, 
Britain and the Commonwealth of likely developments 
in European integration, he suggested that we should 
work together on issues rather than in isolation from 
one another.
Britain remained by far New Zealand’s major market. 
My discussions with British agriculture and trade offi cials 
indicated that Lang was building very effectively on the 
legacy of interaction that Ashwin in particular had 
developed in negotiations on bulk purchase agreements. 
It was a very useful complement to my own interviews 
and studies to be involved with the High Commission 
work that Lang was leading. His secondment to 
London equipped him to serve the government well 
in its endeavours to secure a special arrangement to 
protect New Zealand’s interests when Britain decided 
to apply for membership of the European Economic 
Community. (A British offi cial apparently dubbed him 
‘the Hapsburg diplomat’.)
He became increasingly infl uential in the policy-making 
process after his return from London, fi rst as chief 
research offi cer at the Treasury, and later as assistant 
secretary in 1965, deputy secretary in 1966 and secretary 
between 1968 and his retirement early in 1977. (In 
his history of the Treasury, Malcolm McKinnon 
(McKinnon, 2003) notes that it was necessary for 
anyone aspiring to be the secretary of the Treasury to 
have had experience as fi nance offi cer. Henry obtained 
that experience in 1962–63.) 
Some obituary writers called Lang ‘the father of the 
modern Treasury’. Ashwin had earned similar mana 
and served longer in the top job than Lang.2 But Lang 
did more in deliberately building up a strong team 
of economists and policy analysts in the Treasury by 
good selection and management. The research division 
languished after the retirement of Ashwin and while 
Lang was away. One signifi cant appointment, of Bernard 
Galvin, was made during that period, but few economists 
were recruited until the infl uence of Henry Lang was 
felt from the early 1960s onwards. He was determined 
to ensure that the Treasury acquired and retained people 
with fi rst-class minds and communication skills so that it 
could earn a central position in the advisory system. He 
was always asking me and other university professors if 
we could recommend intelligent young graduates who 
might be persuaded to join the Treasury. As his friend, 
colleague and successor as secretary, Noel Lough, said 
at the memorial service for him, 
he sought an ability to think clearly, critically, and 
to write well. He deliberately sought graduates in all 
disciplines so that the Treasury did not become too 
narrowly focused on accounting and economics. In 
recruitment, and in allocation of work and promotion, 
women were given equal opportunity to rise up the 
ladder on their merit.
He was more successful than other departments in 
attracting and retaining good people. His staff enjoyed 
the early responsibility delegated to them, and Lang’s 
personal interest in their contribution, including 
their active participation in vigorous debate within 
the institution. McKinnon’s history of the Treasury 
emphasises his importance in engineering a shift in the 
pecking order of responsibility, from those engaged in 
‘saving candle ends’ to those focused on providing advice 
on New Zealand’s economic and social development 
(McKinnon, 2003, especially pp.226-73). In the 
process, he signifi cantly increased the infl uence of the 
Treasury in the offi cial committees that were established 
to co-ordinate public service advice to Cabinet. (A 
Treasury signature was required on all such reports 
before they went to Cabinet.)
Henry Lang served three ministers of fi nance during 
his term as secretary: Robert Muldoon (twice), Bill 
Rowling and Bob Tizard. Even before he attained the 
offi ce of secretary he represented the Treasury often in 
high-level discussions with ministers on policy, and 
therefore exerted infl uence greater than his position 
might have suggested. According to one of his most 
respected colleagues at the Treasury, Jas McKenzie, ‘his 
skill with ministers was truly formidable. Watching 
2 According to Geoff Schmitt, Ashwin was more of a loner in 
establishing the power and infl uence of the Treasury during most 
of his time at the top. His decision to increase the numbers of those 
with economic expertise in his department was a reaction to an 
advertisement by the Ministry of Works for three economists as 
research offi cers. Ashwin persuaded the Public Service Commission 
that these positions should be relocated to the Treasury. Albert 
McGregor, Lou Durbin and Geoff Schmitt were appointed. Henry 
Lang joined soon afterwards, as did others like Jim Moriarty when 
the Stabilisation Commission was disbanded.
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Henry take a complex brief and lay it out for a Cabinet 
committee, quietly but incisively, was both a delight 
and a great learning experience. No wonder ministers 
always valued his counsel’ (McKenzie, 1997)
The 1960s and 1970s were dominated by widespread 
debate on how best to improve New Zealand’s lagging 
rate of growth, reduce its dependence on the British 
market and on a narrow range of relatively unprocessed 
commodities, and bring infl ation and instability under 
better control. Treasury advice refl ected Lang’s belief, 
which I shared, that it was important to aim for a 
more open and adaptable economy, to move away from 
excessive protection behind a wall of import licensing 
and to reduce reliance on administrative controls in 
stabilisation policy (Lang, 1973). This would require 
greater emphasis on the tools of monetary, fi scal and 
exchange-rate policy that worked through markets. 
Even politicians who agreed in principle with this 
philosophy found it politically diffi cult to put it into 
practice. Protected manufacturers and unions were 
politically infl uential and wedded to retaining import 
licensing. They were supported by some within the 
public service, especially in the Department of Industries 
and Commerce when led by signifi cant fi gures such as 
W.B. Sutch and Jack Lewin. Leading members of the 
National Party rightly or wrongly believed that their 
qualifi ed support for a move away from import licensing 
to a more uniform and less protective tariff was an 
important factor in their loss of the 1972 election. This 
belief coloured their attitude to the development of a 
genuine free trade area with Australia; in the agreement 
for CER introduced in 1983 they insisted on a 15-year 
period for the phasing out of import licensing.
The Treasury also faced political resistance, and divided 
opinions within the economics profession, if it was 
suggested that governments should consider increasing 
taxation or interest rates or altering the exchange rate 
as instruments of stabilisation or development policy. 
The papers produced by people from the research 
division of the Treasury, including Henry Lang, refl ect 
the efforts that they were making to apply the principles 
of Keynesian analysis to the issues confronting New 
Zealand society. The politicians were happy to accept 
these principles as a means of avoiding any downswings 
in the rates of growth of production and employment. 
They were reluctant to apply the principles to countering 
the infl ationary pressures which were so strong in the 
1960s and 1970s. Accordingly, the history of this period 
is replete with instances of economists jousting with 
politicians on how best to stabilise fl uctuations in the 
New Zealand economy. The adverse public reaction to 
the so-called ‘black budget’ introduced by the Nash–
Nordmeyer administration in 1958 exerted a restraining 
infl uence on tax policy for many years afterwards. 
The conventional wisdom also favoured fi xed exchange 
rates. The exchange rate established by the Labour 
government after a large revaluation in 1948 began to 
look increasingly unsuitable in the early 1960s. Many 
economists might have advocated greater fl exibility in 
less infl ationary circumstances, but there were strong 
cost-plus influences in the heavily protected New 
Zealand economy that could quickly dissipate the 
benefi cial effects of devaluation or depreciation.
The debate within the Treasury team was producing 
increasingly more market-oriented advice on strategy 
for more rapid and stable development. Lang strongly 
believed in maintaining the independence and integrity 
of Treasury advice to ministers and Cabinet. He also 
accepted that, as a public servant, he must assist the 
elected government to implement its policies to the 
best of his ability. This required him and the Treasury 
from time to time to devise policy instruments that 
they would regard as ‘second-best’ compromise 
means of achieving the government’s objectives. Such 
compromises included tax incentives directed at the 
earning of overseas exchange and various forms of 
incomes policy. 
The Holyoake government was persuaded after the 
1966 election that budgetary restraint was required 
to reduce infl ationary pressure in the economy. Lang 
found Robert Muldoon, as a relatively new minister of 
fi nance, effective in his capacity to utilise new means 
of communication to ‘sell’ to the electorate what was 
probably as ‘black’ a budget as that of 1958. This set 
the stage for him to take advantage of a devaluation of 
the pound sterling to devalue the New Zealand dollar 
by a greater percentage, thus restoring the parity with 
Australia that had existed prior to 1948.
In the early 1960s I had been advocating that 
government should promote more market-oriented 
consultative planning of development. The Holyoake 
government supported the idea and held a number of 
development conferences, culminating in the National 
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Development Conference (NDC) of 1968–69. Lang 
saw these as an opportunity to promote discussion 
and debate on strategic issues within the public sector 
and among the various interest groups. He became the 
dominant fi gure in enabling the Treasury team to play 
a leading role in co-ordinating consultations among 
the public sector, representatives of private enterprise 
and research institutions on how best to improve New 
Zealand’s economic and social development.
The Treasury required considerable strengthening in its 
own expertise and the co-operation of experts in other 
institutions if it was to be successful in this role. Lang 
provided outstanding leadership in fostering Treasury’s 
own capacity for analysis and research. He was adept 
at securing co-operation from others in the task. He 
was so charming and persuasive that it was almost 
impossible to refuse requests from him to help. For 
example, he persuaded Jim Rowe, then the director of 
the Institute of Economic Research, and me to assist in 
the establishment of a planning unit in the Treasury and 
in producing a section on planning and government in 
the 1966 Economic Review. Several other academics felt 
obliged to accede to pleas from Henry that he needed 
them to help him develop his ideas or to get the outcome 
of your mutual efforts across to a wider audience. When 
my wife sometimes protested at the effects of one of 
these pleas, he would have the gall to tell her that she 
should stop me working so hard.
He used his persuasive skills effectively in harnessing 
the skills of good people in the universities, the Reserve 
Bank, the Institute of Economic Research and the Meat 
and Wool Board Economic Service in joint efforts to 
serve the NDC institutions while improving the basis 
of research, statistics and other information required. 
He also led signifi cant improvements in the way the 
public accounts were prepared, laying better foundations 
for decision making in the public sector by clarifying 
objectives, recording costs and requiring more forward-
looking programming of expenditure as a better basis 
for determining priorities.
While public servants at the time were considerably 
inhibited from revealing their views in public, Lang did 
as much as he could to foster informed public discussion 
of major issues of public policy. Those of us who served 
on the Monetary and Economic Council found him 
very supportive of our ‘public watchdog’ functions. He 
had always been ready to accept invitations to share his 
knowledge and experience in programmes like the DPA 
at Victoria University, and in many other continuing 
education activities, such as the work of the Institute 
of Public Administration. He was president of the 
institute in 1960/61 and played a signifi cant role in the 
establishment of the Administrative Staff College (later 
the College of Management.)3
The NDC planning mechanisms atrophied and lost 
touch with government decisions after 1972. After 
Muldoon’s success in the 1975 election, Lang persuaded 
him not to try to resurrect the old NDC institutions, but 
to commission a wide-ranging strategic audit by a task 
force, under me as an independent chair, encompassing 
economic, social, cultural and regional issues. Through 
the Treasury he organised a competent secretariat for 
the task force from several government departments 
and the Reserve Bank. The report of the task force 
became the basis for the creation of a New Zealand 
Planning Council of able individuals, not dominated 
by representatives of interest groups and government. 
Although the minister of national development and 
secretary of the Treasury were members, the council was 
given considerable independence to publish its collective 
views on policy options to deal with issues it considered 
to be strategically important in the medium term. Lang 
was very supportive of these arrangements.
Lang’s relationship with Muldoon appeared to have 
been reasonably good during the latter’s apprenticeship 
as minister of fi nance from 1967 to 1972. During that 
period, Muldoon, with Holyoake’s support, displayed 
greater readiness than his predecessors in the postwar 
period to utilise and sell to the public fi rmer fi scal 
measures and some adjustment of the exchange rate to 
help stabilise the New Zealand economy. He also found 
Lang and the Treasury helpful to him in carrying out the 
role he was allocated in the proceedings of the NDC.
Lang had a very good professional and personal 
relationship with Bill Rowling as minister of fi nance in 
the Labour government which took offi ce in 1972. This 
continued in a modifi ed way when Rowling became 
prime minister.4 Together they faced considerable 
diffi culties as a result of the commodity boom that 
3 He was also infl uential in the setting up of the Royal Commission 
on the State Services during his presidency.
4 They also continued a friendly relationship in later years, including 
as colleagues on the board of the Musueum of New Zealand Te 
Papa Tongarewa.
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prevailed in the early stages of this administration. 
Norman Kirk, as prime minister, was suspicious of 
intellectuals generally and the sorts of adviser employed 
in the Treasury in particular. His government wanted to 
spend heavily on health, education and welfare. After the 
fi rst oil crisis, Rowling, Tizard and Lang had to lead an 
agonising reappraisal of expectations and policies. The 
policies adopted put considerable emphasis on liberalising 
the import licensing system in the fi rst instance, some 
attempts to stabilise pay-outs to exporters, on monetary 
more than fi scal measures to restrain excessive spending, 
and on increasing recourse to overseas borrowing in an 
endeavour to sustain output and employment – always 
a priority in Lang’s personal policy objectives.
Muldoon had a sweeping victory in the 1975 election. 
Lang kept a confidential diary of the transition.5 
When he called on Muldoon on 3 December he 
was received ‘most cordially. For the fi rst time in my 
association with him, he got up from his desk, came 
towards me and shook my hand and offered me a seat.’ 
However, at a long session on 4 December, Muldoon 
‘returned to his more normal abrasive manner’. This 
change probably stemmed from discussion of the 
prime minister’s intention to abolish Labour’s New 
Zealand Superannuation (NZS) scheme. Lang advised 
Muldoon that he did not want to be involved in the 
NZS discussions. He had had some acrimonious 
exchanges with Muldoon when the latter was leader of 
the opposition because Muldoon considered that, as an 
offi cial, Lang had become excessively supportive of the 
Labour scheme. Lang drew attention to some of the 
problems of its abolition, for example in equity between 
employees in NZS and those in other schemes, and the 
economic impact to be expected from the return of $50 
million of past contributions and the loss of an infl ow of 
$100 million in new contributions. Muldoon said that 
these could easily be handled. He was impatient with 
administrative delays. While objections from actuaries 
could be expected, ‘they were barely useful people’. In his 
diary Henry commented, ‘his ignorance was exceeded 
only by his breathtaking arrogance’. 
Lang was disturbed to fi nd that Muldoon intended 
to release part of a secret report of the Treasury on 
economic strategy, believing this would be damaging to 
the government and unhelpful to the Treasury. He asked 
to see Muldoon and had a half-hour meeting ‘which 
can be described in a variety of ways but amicable is 
not among them’. He told Muldoon that the tradition 
was for confi dential advice by the Treasury not to be 
published. The only previous occasion had been a 
mistake. Muldoon replied that he had criticised the 
Labour Party for not publishing and said he intended 
to publish; Lang reserved the right to respond publicly. 
Behind the scenes he apparently managed to get the 
prime minster’s chief press secretary to amend the release 
so that it was ‘damaging but not disastrous’.
Muldoon wanted to have a small Prime Minister’s 
Department, independent of Foreign Affairs. After some 
discussion about its composition and functions, Lang 
was gratifi ed that his Treasury colleague, Bernard Galvin, 
was generally approved as the most suitable person for 
the job of heading the Prime Minister’s Offi ce and 
Advisory Group. Later in the month Lang discovered 
that the prime minister had told a television audience 
that the secretary of Treasury was entirely happy with 
arrangements in the Prime Minister’s Department. 
Lang’s diary entry observes that ‘he had not consulted 
me ... but made the usual presumption that whatever 
suited him had to bring joy to his slaves’.
After the election Muldoon decided to move quickly to 
curb consumer spending by increasing charges for public 
services and prices for petrol, milk and bread. Lang thought 
this was too defl ationary and was concerned about the 
possible effects on unemployment. He was becoming 
concerned that, as both prime minister and minister of 
fi nance, Muldoon could be trying to drive a wedge between 
him and Galvin. He had concluded that the prime minister 
was becoming a one-man band who had no faith in the 
overwhelming majority of his ministers.
According to Barry Gustafson, when Lang, at a time 
of considerable economic diffi culty, decided to retire 
early in 1977 (at the age of 58), Muldoon was annoyed 
(Gustafson, 2000, p.179).6 He felt Lang had put his 
own interests ahead of his public service duty in not 
staying on as secretary of the Treasury until he reached 
60.7 Although Lang had been a very effective head of 
the Treasury for eight diffi cult years, Muldoon opposed a 
5 This is included among his papers in the Alexander Turnbull 
Library.
6 Gustafson wrongly reports that Lang retired at 56.
7 Lang was reported in an interview published in the Evening Post 
on 1 April 1996 to have said, ‘I did n’t like Muldoon, but he was a 
very effective minister. I respected him and he respected me, and 
he would have preferred me to stay.’ 
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knighthood for him and the Cabinet honours committee 
concurred with a lesser honour. Accordingly, Ashwin 
remained the only Treasury secretary to have been, as 
McKinnon put it, ‘encumbered’ with a knighthood 
(McKinnon, 2003, p.216). Easton considers that Lang 
would have refused a knighthood anyway – for him to 
be called ‘Sir Henry’ was ‘unthinkable’ (Easton, 2001). 
I believe that he would have accepted and carried the 
honour with humble pride and grace, as he did the more 
prestigious award of the ONZ many years later.
Was Lang ‘a regulator like his Minister’, as Roderick 
Deane is quoted as describing him in Michael and 
Judith Bassett’s biography of Deane (Bassett and Bassett, 
2006)?8 Lang’s 1973 paper on economic and foreign 
policy indicates that he was opposed to ‘fortress New 
Zealand’ policies, and considered that industries should 
be able to adapt to lower protection as part of a policy of 
structural change to promote growth and diversify trade 
(Lang, 1973). But that policy should include effective 
and innovative industrial policies embracing research and 
development, fi scal incentives, tariff reform, adjustment 
assistance and active labour market measures. Thus he 
saw the state playing a very active role in moving towards 
a more open and competitive economy. 
He also revealed a bias towards using a substantial 
proportion of the benefits of faster growth in the 
improvement of the social environment rather than 
in the provision of additional material goods. At his 
memorial service, many of his friends commented on 
how much he hoped that New Zealand would remain 
a relatively egalitarian society.
While he was sceptical of the effectiveness of incomes 
policies, there is some evidence that he was more 
pragmatic than some of his colleagues, especially an 
increasing number of younger ones, in his approach to 
the return to direct controls on incomes and prices to 
counter the ‘stagfl ation’ that beset the protected, cost-
plus economy from the late 1960s. While approving of 
much of the radical reform programme of the Labour 
government of 1984–90, Lang considered that it had 
paid inadequate attention to trying to avoid high 
unemployment and the social problems and racial 
tension associated with it. It is not surprising that 
he was regarded as ‘interventionist’ by some of those 
who believed that rapid and radical market-oriented 
reform was vital for New Zealand’s future economic 
and social development.
In the late 1980s Lang was concerned by what he saw as 
the collapse of the pre-1984 system of interdepartmental 
co-ordination and co-operation in the public service 
and the reduced consultation with the private sector, 
which increased policy uncertainty. He considered that 
the Treasury had become a monolithic institution of 
high quality, dedicated to a framework of advice based 
on a free-market creed, but paying little attention to 
the foregoing problems and the impact of the policies 
on people adversely affected by them. The Treasury, 
he believed, faced insuffi cient intellectual checks and 
balances on its dominance within the public service. 
If a return to a more collegiate policy-making process 
by senior officials and ministers were not deemed 
practicable, he would advocate building up a more 
powerful Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
as an alternative designed to ensure more adequate, 
forward-looking policy co-ordination.
After his retirement from the Treasury early in 1977, 
Lang became a visiting professor of economics and 
convenor of the Master of Public Policy programme 
at Victoria University. He had all the qualities of an 
excellent teacher. Such people bring out the best in 
their students; always recognise that there is much 
more to learn even in fi elds in which they are supposed 
to be expert; enjoy discussion and debate with people 
whose views differ from their own; and expect younger 
people to be able to bring fresh perspectives to bear on 
issues with which they are dealing. That was Henry’s 
natural style.
He continued to take an active interest in the Planning 
Council after he left the Treasury, and was infl uential 
in its work on taxation, income maintenance and the 
welfare state. When it came under threat of abolition 
by Muldoon in 1982, Lang played a leading role with 
John Roberts, myself and some senior public servants in 
successfully negotiating for the creation of an Institute 
of Policy Studies at Victoria University. His experience 
with the NDC and the Planning Council had persuaded 
him that an Institute of Policy Studies in the university 
in the capital city would have the best chance of 
8 In the Bassetts’ biography, Lang is said to have protested to Governor 
Alan Low about one of Deane’s speeches advocating the need for 
monetary policy to infl uence both the supply and cost of credit and 
to work through market forces. Such advocacy would not have 
been welcomed by Muldoon, Lang’s minister. The governor did not 
dissuade Deane from continuing to publish his views (Bassett and 
Bassett, 2006, p.50).
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independently anticipating and exploring potentially 
contentious strategic policy issues, and bringing them 
out for public discussion without fear or favour. But 
he also saw that its success would depend on its ability 
to attract and retain a director and staff of quality, and 
on the support of far-sighted top offi cials and business 
people as well as the university community. As the fi rst 
chairman of the institute, Lang was most infl uential in 
generating the necessary support. He worked hard for 
many years to ensure that the quality of its work justifi ed 
continuation. His abiding interest in its future was 
refl ected in his generous bequest to endow the Henry 
Lang Fellowship to enable scholars of high quality to 
devote time to independent research into important 
policy issues.
Lang also made significant contributions to the 
development of the Diploma of Community Medicine 
at the Wellington Clinical School, and chaired 
government reviews of the health workforce and cardiac 
surgery. He earned great respect as a director of several 
companies, and as the chair of the board of a major 
insurance company. He continued to be a source of wise 
counsel to public servants in his university positions and 
privately to some politicians. 
Henry and Tup Lang shared wide interests in physical 
recreation, books, theatre and the performing arts. 
Henry was a member of the board of the Museum 
of New Zealand, and a leader in the development 
of public sculpture in Wellington. Appropriately, 
a group of sculptures entitled ‘Kaiwhakatere: the 
Navigator’ was commissioned in his honour and 
located on a piece of land between Parliament 
buildings and the Treasury.
In education, health and cultural activities, as in 
his public service career, Henry Lang served his 
fellow New Zealanders with zest and energy. He was 
always seeking opportunities to break down artifi cial 
barriers and stereotypes dividing different groups 
in the community by getting them to look ahead 
and focus on how best to deal with issues of mutual 
concern. It was fi tting that both the university and the 
government should have conferred on this remarkable 
man the highest distinctions that they were able to 
bestow. In everything he did, he showed us how to 
live life well, enjoy it to the full and make friends and 
admirers in all walks of life.
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